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REGULATION OF INTERMODAL RATE 
COMPETITION IN TRANSPORTATION 
Joseph R. Rose* 
P ERSISTENT efforts by railroads to reduce the control exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) over rates 
applicable to competition among different modes of transport have 
precipitated perhaps the most acrimonious controversy in transport 
regulation since World War II. The railroads have vigorously 
pressed their arguments on the Commission, the courts, and the 
Congress. They have had the support of two Presidents,1 two Secre-
taries of Commerce,2 the Department of Transportation,3 and the 
weight of academic opinion.4 Yet thus far they have failed to 
effect a change in either the Commission's policy or the law govern-
ing it; and the Supreme Court has twice dealt inconclusively with 
the issues. 5 
The controversy over intermodal rate competition comprehends 
both legal and economic issues. Clarity requires that each be explic-
itly stated and separately treated. The legal issues center on the 
meaning of section 15a(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act6 and 
• Professor Emeritus of Transportation and Public Utilities, Wharton School of Fi-
nance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.B. 1920, J.D. 1923, University of 
Chicago; Ph.D. 1938, University of Pennsylvania.-Ed. 
The invaluable assistance of Dr. Bruce Allen, Assistant Professor of Regional Science 
and Transportation, University of Pennsylvania, is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE TRANSPORTA-
TION SYSTEM OF OUR NATION, April 5, 1962, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1962); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 348, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 
(1966); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 28, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 
(1969). 
2. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT POLICY AND ORGANIZATION, RE-
VISION OF FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY (1955) (Weeks Report); U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS (1960) (Mueller Report). 
3. Statements submitted by Paul N. Cherington, Assistant Secretary for Policy and 
International Affairs, and his successor Charles D. Baker on January 30 and April 30, 
1970, respectively, before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) 
in Rules To Govern the Assembling &: Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298 
(1970) [hereinafter Docket No. 34013]. 
4. See, e.g., Baumol, et al., The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad 
Services, 35 U. CHI. J. Bus. 357 (1962) [hereinafter Baumol]; Baumol, et al., Statement 
of Clarification, 36 U. CHI. J. Bus. 348 (1963) [hereinafter Baumol, Clarification]. Both 
of these publications were prepared jointly by ten academic economists under the 
auspices of the Association of American Railroads. 
5. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968) 
[hereinafter Ingot Molds]; ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963) [here-
inafter New Haven]. 
6. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964), formerly Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 6, 72 Stat. 572 (1958), 
For studies prior to 1958, see E. '\\TII.LIAMS, THE REGULATION OF RAIL-MOTOR RATE 
[ IOll] 
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the declaration of the National Transportation Policy that precedes 
the Act, 7 which are the sources of the Commission's authority. The 
economic issues involve the effect on resource allocation of rate-
making proposals devised to carry out these provisions of the Act. 
I. THE LEGAL ISSUES 
Section 15a(3), added to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1958, 
states that "[i]n a proceeding involving competition between carriers 
of different modes of transportation subject to this Act, the Commis-
sion, in determining whether a rate is lower than a reasonable 
minimum rate, shall consider the facts and circumstances attending 
the movement of the traffic by the carrier . . . to which the rate is 
applicable" and that "[r]ates of a carrier shall not be held up to 
a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of trans-
portation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national 
transportation policy declared in this Act."8 The National Transpor-
tation Policy provides, inter alia, for the 
fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject 
to the • . . Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the 
inherent advantages of each; . . . all to the end of developing, co-
ordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, 
highway, and rail, as well as other means adequate to meet the needs 
of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of 
the national defense.9 
COMPETITION (1958); Bigham, Regulation of Minimum Rates in Transportation, 61 Q.J. 
ECON, 173 (1947). 
7. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 
722, tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 899). 
8. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964). Section 15a(3) applies only to competition among 
regulated modes; it does not apply to competition between regulated and unregulated 
carriers. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 593 
(1968). Rate-making, when the competing carrier is unregulated, is governed by § 1(5) 
of the Act, which provides that rates shall be "just and reasonable." A just and rea-
sonable rate is "compensatory" (Limestone in Trainloads from Prairie du Rocher, Ill. 
to Baton Rouge, La., 313 I.C.C. 71, 86 (1960)), which means that it must be in excess 
of "out-of-pocket" cost (ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 748 (1963)). See 
note 18 infra. The Commission has stated, "While rates which exceed out-of-pocket 
costs by only slight margins have been approved when required by special circum-
stances, the Commission has never taken the view that any particular margin must 
be set. Logic dictates that each rate must be judged in light of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding it." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 I.C.C. 589, 
596 (1967). For illustrations of "special circumstances," see Grain in Multiple-Car 
Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 318 I.C.C. 641, 684, revd., 321 I.C.C. 582 
(1963), revd. sub nom. Cincinnati, N.O. &: T.P. Ry. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 572 
(S.D. Ohio 1964), vacated and remanded sub nom. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, 
N.O.T.P. Ry., 379 U.S. 642, affd. on remand, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965); Coal from Southern 
Mines to Tampa and Sutton, Fla., 318 I.C.C. 371, 386 (1962). 
9. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1964). 
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The Supreme Court, construing section 15a(3) for the first time 
in ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. (New Haven),10 declared that 
the principal reason for the reference in that section to the National 
Transportation Policy "was to emphasize the power of the Commis-
sion to prevent the railroads from destroying or impairing the in-
herent advantages of other modes,"11 and it decided that the "initial 
determination" of which mode had the inherent advantages must 
be made by the Commission.12 The Act does not define "inherent 
advantages"; in New Haven the Court casually mentioned "cost and 
service" advantages but failed to define those terms.13 The concept 
of "service advantage" has occasioned little controversy,14 but the 
search for the proper definition of "cost advantage" now constitutes 
the basic legal issue in proceedings under section 15a(3). 
A. The Commission's Policy 
According to the Commission, service advantage is measured by 
comparing shipper costs associated with particular transport ser-
vices.15 Shipper costs include such expenses as are incurred by ship-
pers for loading, unloading, drayage, and breakage; they also include 
inventory costs, which are often their most important ingredient. 
The Commission regards the carrier that requires the smaller ship-
ping costs as the mode of transport with the service advantage.16 
Cost advantage, on the other hand, is derived by comparing car-
rier costs of the competing modes of transport;17 and the recurring 
legal controversy has centered on determining the proper method of 
measuring carrier cost for use in the comparative equation. The 
IO. 372 U.S. 744 (1963). 
11. 372 U.S. at 758. 
12. 372 U.S. at 763-64. 
13. 372 U.S. at 755-56, 759. 
14. The concept of service advantage is not directly relevant to the task of rate-
making. Service advantage is for practical purposes a demand factor, with which the 
regulatory authority should not concern itself in determining inherent advantage. If 
rates reflect differences in carriers' marginal costs (see notes 70 &: 71 infra and ac-
companying text and pt. II. B. 2. infra), and shippers select the mode that minimizes 
their total transport costs, traffic tends to be economically allocated. 
15. Fresh Meats, Transcontinental, Westbound, 309 I.C.C. 529, 535, 544 (1960); 
Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 309 I.C.C. 347, 353 (1960). The 
Commission found service differences between two modes minimal in Motor Vehicles 
from Kansas City to Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas, 318 I.C.C. 301, 319-20 (1962). See 
also J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON &: C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN 
THE TRANSPORTATION lNDUsrRIES 189-90 (1959). 
16. Cement within Southern Territory &: from Hagerstown, Md., to the South, 319 
I.C.C. 465, 471, 475 (1963). 
17. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 83 (1965). See also Docket No. 
M013, supra note 3. 
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Commission has generally used fully distributed costs rather than 
out-of-pocket costs as the appropriate standard18 and has regarded 
the carrier with the lower fully distributed cost as the mode with 
the cost advantage.19 
18. "Out-of-pocket" and "fully distributed" costs were the terms employed by the 
ICC until its disposition of the rule-making proceeding in Docket No. 34013, supra 
note 3. In that proceeding, the Commission decided to substitute for that terminology 
"variable" and "fuIIy allocated" costs respectively, which were given slightly different 
meanings. 
Out-of-pocket costs included "80% of freight operating expenses, rents and taxes 
(excluding Federal income taxes) plus a return of 4 percent after Federal income taxes 
on 50 percent of the road property and 100 percent of the equipment used in freight 
service." ICC, BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS STATEMENT No. 2-68, RAIL CARLOAD COST SCALES BY 
TERRITORIES FOR THE YEAR 1966, at 4 (1968). The Commission regarded 80% as the mea-
sure of cost variability (elasticity). Id. For an explanation of the procedure to determine 
variability, see ICC, BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS STA'IEMENT No. 7-63, ExPLANATION OF RAu. 
COST FINDING PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE USE OF COSTS clI. 2 (1963). 
FuIIy distributed costs included "in addition to the out-of-pocket costs as described 
above, aII other revenue needs necessary to permit the carriers to cover the remaining 
20 percent of the freight operating expenses, rents, and taxes, the passenger-train and 
less-carload operating deficits and a return of 4 percent after Federal income taxes on 
the remaining property." STATEMENT No. 2-68, supra at 4. 
In Docket No. 34013, the Commission, inter alia, adopted new cost terminology. It 
found that "[t]he terms 'out-of-pocket costs' and 'fully distributed costs,' as used in 
Commission proceedings, should be changed to 'variable costs' and 'fuIIy allocated costs,' 
respectively, and the noncost elements of profit, income taxes, and for railroads, the 
passenger and less-than-carload deficits, should be excluded therefrom." 337 I.C.C. at 
326. The Commission also made a change in the determination of the "variability fac-
tor." It found that "[t]he determination of a variability factor for particular services 
requires the selection of an appropriate time period whiclI is sufficiently long to reflect 
adequately those clianges in operations re5ulting in expenses whiclI can reasonably be 
expected to vary with the performance of the particular service or services rendered." 
337 I.C.C. at 326. 
It should be noted that the Commission in this rule-making proceeding explicitly 
refused to adopt any criterion of inherent cost advantage. The Examiner had recom-
mended that "(7) inherent cost advantages should generally be protected through the 
approval of prescription of rate differentials, measured by the difference between the 
respective fully allocated cost levels of competing modes of transportation, when the 
involved rates are shown to be below suclI levels." Docket No. 34013, Examiners' 
Recommended Report and Order 123 (Oct. 10, 1966). The Commission declared that 
it would consider "matters relating to recommended finding No. 7 (dealing with in-
herent cost advantages as between competing modes)" in related proceedings in Cost 
Standards in lntermodal Rate Proceedings, Docket No. 34013 (Sub-No. 1), which will 
be the subject of a separate report. 337 I.C.C. at 301. The latter proceeding was not 
initiated until February 5, 1969, almost seven years after the inception of Docket No. 
34013 and more than six months after the decision in Ingot Molds. In that case, the 
Supreme Court refused to decide the issue of cost advantage until the Commission 
made an "initial determination," whiclI the Court obviously expected in Docket No. 
34013. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text. 
19. In tlie absence of evidence of fuIIy distributed costs, the Commission has used 
out-of-pocket costs as the measure of cost advantage. Automobile Lamps &: Alcoholic 
Liquors, Pennsylvania to Texas &: Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 335, 338 (1963). For a full 
discussion of the Commission's conception of cost advantage, see Grain in Multiple-Car 
Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 321 I.C.C. 582, 596-604 (1963), modified on 
other grounds, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965) (discussed in note 8 supra). The Commission 
decided tliat in determining "inherent" cost advantage, public expenditures on the 
domestic-waterway system should not be attributed to the water carriers. 
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In proceedings involving railroad rates reduced to meet the com-
petition of water carriers, the evidence typically shows that water 
carriers have the cost advantage and railroads have the service advan-
tage.20 In cases that involve competition between railroads and motor 
carriers, the evidence usually shows that when the railroad service 
is performed by conventional freight cars the railroads have the cost 
advantage and the motor carriers have the service advantage;21 when 
railroad service involves such improved facilities as trailer-on-flat 
cars (TOFC), however, cost and service advantages may be equally 
divided bet1veen the two modes.~2 
Before New Haven, the Commission did not commonly make an 
explicit "initial finding" of inherent advantage in proceedings under 
section 15a(3). Its policy, generally, was to maintain railroad mini-
mum rates at a level that enabled regulated water and motor carriers 
to compete with railroads at rates covering the nonrail carriers' fully 
distributed costs.23 Railroad rates below such a minimum were con-
demned by the Commission as "destructive competition" even when 
they exceeded the railroads' fully distributed costs.24 Thus, railroad 
rates were required to be differentially above the approved rates of 
competing water carriers-that is, above the water carriers' fully dis-
tributed costs;25 similarly, the Commission approved railroad rates 
20. See, e.g., American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville&: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 
575-76 (1968). 
21. See, e.g., Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 309 I.C.C. 347, 
353 (1960). Occasionally, however, the Commission finds the service advantages equally 
divided between rail and motor. Exceptions Ratings on Agricultural, Roadmaking, and 
Other Articles, 315 I.C.C. 9, 14 (1961), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Missouri Pac. 
R.R. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1962). 
22. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles from Kansas City to Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas, 
318 I.C.C. 301, 319 (1962). Service differences were there found to be minimal, but 
trailer-on-flat-car [hereinafter TOFC] rail service had the lower costs. In rate-making 
proceedings, motor carriers often fail to introduce evidence of their costs. Paint &: Re-
lated Articles in Official Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 448 (1959). 
23. Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 49 (1960) [hereinafter Pan-
Atlantic], revd., New York, N.H. &: H.R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 
1961), remanded to ICC, ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963). 
24. 313 ICC at 47. See also note 25 infra. 
25. In Pan-Atlantic, tl1e leading case, the ICC condemned as destructive competi-
tion railroad rates that had been reduced to the level of competing coastwise water 
carrier rates. Although there was evidence of record to support a finding of cost 
advantage in favor of the coastwise water carriers, the Commission did not make 
such a finding. All of the railroad rates were compensatory and most of them were 
above fully distributed costs. The ICC declared that, under the circumstances, the 
railroad rates should be 6% higher than the competing water rates. 313 I.C.C. at 50. 
Before Pan-Atlantic, the Commission had rarely found railroad rates unlawful 
under § 15a(3). It distinguished the earlier cases from Pan-Atlantic on the ground 
that in those cases the reduced rates did not threaten to cause successive rate reduc-
tions-tllat is, rate wars. The ICC cited the following proceedings in which it had 
approved reduced railroad rates, whether the rates covered fully distributed costs or 
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differentially below the rates or fully distributed costs of competing 
merely out-of-pocket costs: Magnesium from Velasco, Tex. to East St. Louis, Ill., 
309 I.C.C. 659 (1960), revg. 306 I.C.C. 45 (1959); Lumber from California &: Oregon 
to California &: Arizona, 308 I.C.C. 345 (1959); Paint &: Related Articles in Official 
Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439 (1959); Sugar to Ohio River Crossings, 308 I.C.C. 167 (1959), 
revd., 315 I.C.C. 521 (1962), affd. on rehearing, 319 I.C.C. 782 (1963). The Commission 
also had approved reduced railroad rates in Export Soybeans from Southwest &: South 
to Gulf Ports, 309 I.C.C. 445 (1960) (in which the reduced railroad rates were com• 
pensatory but greatly in excess of competing barge rates); Pig Iron from Ashland, Ky., 
to Kansas City, Mo., 310 I.C.C. 641 (1960), (in which some of the reduced railroad 
rates covered fully distributed costs and others were merely compensatory); and Paper 
from St. Francisville, La. to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 703 (1959) (no differential above 
water rates required because of the high level of both rail and water rates). See also 
Iron or Steel Slabs from Cincinnati, Ohio &: Newport, Ky. to Riverdale, Ill., 308 I.C.C. 
151 (1959); Synthetic Resin from New York Area, 305 I.C.C. 5 (1958); Tinplate from 
St. Louis Group to Texas, 304 I.C.C. 473 (1958). In Roofing or Siding from the Twin 
Cities to South Dakota, 308 I.C.C. 278 (1959), the Commission approved "fully com-
pensatory" motor rates below the competing railroad rates; and in Class Rates from 
Chicago, Ill. to Texas, 308 I.C.C. 467 (1958), it held compensatory freight fonvarder 
and motor carrier rates lawful under § 15a(3). 
Only one pre-Pan-Atlantic case was found in which the Commission disapproved 
railroad rates under § 15a(3). In Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 
309 I.C.C, 347 (1960), railroad rates covering fully distributed costs were held unlawful 
on the ground they would reduce earnings on high-grade traffic. 
After Pan-Atlantic, the Commission did not again discuss § 15a(3) at length until 
Various Commodities from or to Arkansas&: Texas, 314 I.C.C. 215 (1961). The material 
facts of Various Commodities were similar to those in Pan-Atlantic, except that the 
coastwise water carriers did not present evidence of their costs. The Commission ap-
proved the reduced railroad rates, holding that they could not be considered destruc-
tive competition in the absence of cost evidence. It is noteworthy that the railroad 
rates in Various Commodities were merely compensatory while those in Pan-Atlantic 
for the most part covered fully distributed costs. But following Pan-Atlantic, the Com• 
mission generally continued to reject reduced railroad rates regardless of cost advantage. 
Paint or Varnish Driers from East to Southwest, 313 I.C.C. 719, 722 (1961) (railroad 
rates required to be somewhat less than 6% above water rates because the railroad 
service was performed with box cars rather than TOFC as in Pan-Atlantic); Pig Iron 
from Neville Island, Pa. to Louisville, Ky., 313 I.C.C. 771, 779 (1961), revd., Pennsylvania 
R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (ICC disapproved a railroad 
rate below the total cost to the shipper of using a competing rail-water-rail service 
and required the railroad rate to be equal to such total cost). In only one proceeding 
during this period did the Commission, in holding a competing railroad rate unlawful, 
make a finding of cost advantage in favor of a water carrier. In Newsprint Paper from 
Tennessee &: Alabama to Houston, Tex., 313 I.C.C. 669, 674 (1961), the Commission 
required a railroad rate to exceed the water carrier's fully distributed costs by 10%, 
In Electric Wire &: Cable from Eastern Origins to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 71, 74 (1961), 
the Commission condemned the railroad rate with the statement that "the evidence 
is convincing that Seatrain [the water competitor] is the low cost carrier," but estab-
lished no differential in its favor. 
Even after Various Commodities, the Commission persisted in following Pan-Atlantic 
and in condemning railroad rates as destructive competition without findings of cost 
advantage. Agricultural Insecticides in Tank Cars from Heyden, N.J. to Houston, Tex., 
315 I.C.C. 623 (1962), revd., 319 I.C.C. 493 (1963); Sugar from the South to Indiana, 
Ohio River &: Intermediate Points, 315 I.C.C. 521 (1962), revd., 319 I.C.C. 782 (1963); 
Plastics from Texas to the East, 314 I.C.C. 347 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 379 (1963); 
Commodities in Trailers on Flatcars, East to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 423 (1961); DDT from 
Avon, Pa. to Points in Texas, 314 I.C.C. 453 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 431 (1963); 
Garden Hose&: Electric Cable from New Jersey or Rhode Island to Points in Texas, 
314 I.C.C. 515 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 227 (1963); Cereal, Coffee, Tea, Drugs, Related 
Articles from New Jersey &: Pennsylvania to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 734 (1961), revd., 319 
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motor carriers.26 The differential in the former case was to be large 
enough to compensate for the railroads' service advantage and in the 
latter just low enough to compensate for the motor carriers' service 
advantage. 
The Commission based its policy of maintaining the rates of water 
and motor carriers at the level of fully distributed costs on those 
carriers' need to recover such costs in order to continue their opera-
I.C.C. 424 (1963); Electric Cable &: Wire from Worcester, Mass. to Houston, Tex., 
314 I.C.C. 743 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 390 (1963). The Commission condemned reduced 
railroad rates on the ground that they would dissipate needed revenues on high-value 
traffic. Pig Iron from Buffalo, N.Y. to Chicago, Ill. &: Gary, Ind., 315 I.C.C. 601 (1962); 
Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire l'.: New York to Texas&: Louisiana, 315 I.C.C. 
124 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 396 (1963). The reversals by the Commission came after 
the Supreme Court's decision in New Haven. 
Various Commodities was first cited in Canned Goods from Eastern Points to Pacific 
Coast, 315 I.C.C. 757, 761 (1962), in which the Commission said the evidence must show 
"which is the low cost mode" in order to sustain a claim of destructive competition. 
Thus, reduced railroad rates were approved in the absence of evidence showing the 
protestant to be the low-cost mode in ·wool from Norfolk &: Newport News, Va. to 
Charleston, S.C., 316 I.C.C. 109 (1962); Newsprint Paper from Tennessee &: Alabama 
to Baton Rouge, La., 315 I.C.C. 117 (1961). Compensatory railroad rates were upheld 
in Canned or Preserved Foodstuffs from Pacific Coast to Gulf Ports for Export, 314 
I.C.C. 569 (1961), without discussion of cost advantage, for situations where the railroad 
rates would have no material effect on competing water carriers. Similarly, compensa-
tory railroad rates were approved without mention of Various Commodities in Canned 
Goods from Pacific Coast to Eastern Points, 315 I.C.C. 769 (1962). In Phosphate Rock 
from Florida to Southwestern &: Western Trunkline Territories, 316 I.C.C. 207 (1962), the 
Commission approved compensatory railroad rates where the railroad had the cost 
advantage on some routes and the competing rail-motor-rail service had the cost advan• 
tage on others. 
26. For a clear demonstration of the Commission's method, see Fresh Meats, Trans-
continental, Westbound, 309 I.C.C. 529 (1960). In these early cases, the Commission 
disapproved railroad rates when it foun,l "destructive competition" even if the rail 
rates covered fully distributed costs. See, e.g., Cigars from Jacksonville to Kansas City, 
313 I.C.C. 633 (1961), revd. sub nom. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v. United States, 207 
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Exceptions Ratings on Agricultural, Roadmaking, and 
Other Articles, 315 I.C.C. 9 (1961), revd. sub nom. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 
203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 
309 I.C.C. 347 (1960). 
Prior to New Haven, however, the Commission generally approved railroad rates 
that had been reduced to meet motor-carrier competition. Synthetic Resin from New 
York Area, 305 I.C.C. 5 (1958). In Gasoline &: Fuel Oil from Friendship, N.C. to 
Virginia &: West Virginia, 305 I.C.C. 673 (1959), the Commission approved railroad rates, 
covering fully distributed costs, that were calculated to divide the traffic with motor 
carriers whose rates also covered fully distributed costs. But the agency also approved 
compensatory railroad rates when the evidence indicated that motor carriers could 
compete at their existing rates. See, e.g., Paint and Related Articles in Official Territory, 
308 I.C.C. 439 (1959). After Various Commodities, compensatory rates for TOFC service 
were approved when both railroads and motor carriers failed to offer evidence of 
fully distributed costs. Meats, Fruits, Vegetables-TOFC-Transcontinental, 316 I.C.C. 
585 (1962). And compensatory TOFC rates were upheld although they threatened to 
divert traffic from competing motor carriers. Motor Vehicles from Kansas City to 
Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas, 318 I.C.C. 301 (1962). See also Middlewest Motor Freight 
Bureau v. Great Northern R.R., 316 I.C.C. 443 (1962); Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers 
Assn., Inc. v. Baltimore &: O.R:.R., 314 I.C.C. 5 (1961). Thus, the Commission appeared 
to encourage the TOFC service. 
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tions. A railroad ordinarily serves numerous markets. In some mar-
kets the demand for railroad services is relatively inelastic and a rail 
carrier is thus able to maintain rates at a level substantially above full 
costs. Absent regulation, therefore, a railroad can afford to cut rates 
below its full cost in those markets in which it encounters intermodal 
competition and in which the demand for its services is relatively 
elastic, because these losses can be recovered in inelastic markets. 
A water or motor carrier, on the other hand, normally operates in a 
more restricted area and serves fewer markets. If such a carrier is 
compelled to establish rates below its full costs in some markets, it 
may not have other, less competitive, markets in which it can make 
up the deficits. As a result, the motor or water carrier may be forced 
out of business with its "inherent advantages" destroyed, contrary to 
the objectives of the National Transportation Policy.27 
After New Haven, the Commission rarely found reduced railroad 
rates to constitute destructive competition. It upheld rates covering 
the railroads' fully distributed costs regardless of cost advantage and 
regardless of such rates' effect on competitors' traffic.28 Reversing 
earlier decisions, the Commission approved compensatory railroad 
rates in the absence of proof that objecting carriers had the cost 
advantage.29 The agency also approved compensatory railroad rates 
27. See Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23 (1960), revd., New York, 
N.H. &: H.R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), remanded to ICC, 
ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963). 
28. In Volume Class Rates, Transcontinental Territory, 325 I.C.C. 735, 740 (1965), 
in ·which the lawfulness of motor carrier rates covering fully distributed costs was in 
issue, the Commission said: "[W]e may condemn reduced rates which cover fully 
distributed costs, including a reasonable profit, only in the most compelling circum-
stances." Perhaps such compelling circumstances were presented in New Haven, in 
which the Supreme Court said: "To justify such a result [the rejection of reduced 
rates], we believe it must be demonstrated that the proposed rates in themselves 
genuinely threaten the continued existence of a transportation service that is uniquely 
capable of filling a transcendent national defense or other public need." 372 U.S. 
at 762 (emphasis added). 
No case has been discovered after New Haven in which the Commission found that 
railroad rates that returned fully distributed costs constituted destructive competition. 
See, e.g., Candy &: Confectionery-New Jersey, New York &: Pennsylvania to Texas, 
321 I.C.C. 154, 158-59 (1963), in which the railroad had the cost advantage on some 
services and the water carrier competitors had the cost advantage on others. To the 
same effect, see Magazines or Periodicals from Miami, Fla. to Derby-Shelton, Conn., 
319 I.C.C. 340,342 (1963); Alcoholic Liquors from Maryland, New Jersey &: Pennsylvania 
to Florida, 319 I.C.C. 323, 326-27 (1963). In Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire 
&: New York to Texas &: Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396, 398 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 124 
(1961), the Commission said: "The rates substantially exceed full costs and represent 
a proper exercise of managerial discretion in seeking to increase volume and revenue." 
The Commission noted incidentally that the water carrier protestant did not submit 
evidence to establish cost advantage. 319 I.C.C. at 398. 
29. In several cases, compensatory railroad rates were held lawful when protesting 
motor carriers failed to introduce evidence of their own costs. See, e.g., Freight, All 
Kinds, Southern &: IFA Territories, 323 I.C.C. 730, 739 (1965); Garden Hose &: Electric 
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when they exceeded the protesting carriers' rates and fully dis-
tributed costs30 and when protestants failed to prove that such rates 
"impaired" their ability to obtain traffic at "profitable" levels.31 
In Ingot Molds, Pennsylvania to Steelton, Kentucky (Ingot 
1'.folds),32 however, the Commission rejected a compensatory railroad 
rate that was equal to a competing water carrier rate but below the 
Cable from New Jersey or Rhode Island to Points in Texas, 319 I.C.C. 227, 229 (1963), 
revg. 314 I.C.C. 515 (1961); Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire & New York 
to Texas & Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396, 398 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 124 (1961); 
Aluminum Articles from Sandow, Tex. to Pennsylvania & New Jersey, 319 I.C.C. 431, 
444 (1963), revg. 314 I.C.C. 453 (1961); Steel Bars from Lemont, Ill. to Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Minnesota & Nebraska, 319 I.C.C. 292, 306 (1963); Iron or Steel Articles--
East to Southwest, 321 I.C.C. 419, 425 (1963), vacating order of suspension in 310 I.C.C. 
587 (1960); Cement Within Southern Territory & from Hagerstown, Md. to the South, 
319 I.C.C. 465, 479 (1963). To the same effect, see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Baltimore & 
O.R.R., 326 I.C.C. 708, 712 (1966); Cottonseed Oil, Shreveport La., & Texas to Texas 
Ports, 322 I.C.C. 93, 97 (1964), revd., 323 I.C.C. 698 (1965). 
A rate is regarded as compensatory when "it is greater than the out•of-pocket cost 
of the service for which the rate is set." American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 
& N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 578 n.8 (1968). See also note 8 supra. 
30. See, e.g., Grain from Idaho, Oregon & Washington to Ports in Oregon & 
Washington, 326 I.C.C. 358 (1966), revg. 319 I.C.C. 534 (1963). In that case, the Com-
mission said: "Clearly rates may be established at levels below fully distributed costs 
where, as here, there is a competitive necessity to do so. And where the rates of a 
proponent carrier are above the rates and fully distributed costs of a competitor 
we have no basis for concluding that a destructive competitive practice has occurred." 
326 I.C.C. at 366. When a nonregulated carrier was a major source of competition, 
the Commission had approved compensatory railroad rates below the fully distributed 
costs of another regulated carrier that had the cost advantage and that competed to 
some extent for the traffic. Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167 (1966), affg. 
326 I.C.C. 119 (1965). See also Grain in Multiple-Car Shipments-River Crossings to 
the South, 325 I.C.C. 752, 774 (1965), affg. 318 I.C.C. 641 (1963). 
31. The Commission apparently considers that a profitable rate is one that covers 
fully distributed costs. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 I.C.C. 589, 
596-97 (1967); Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 82 (1965), revd. sub nom. 
Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967), revd. sub nom. 
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968); Wrought 
Pipe to the Southwest, 319 I.C.C. 310, 317-18 (1963), modifying 251 I.C.C. 405 (1942); 
Automobile Lamps & Alcoholic Liquors from Pennsylvania to Texas & Louisiana, 319 
I.C.C. 335, 338 (1963); Magazines or Periodicals from Miami, Fla. to Derby-Shelton, 
Conn., 319 I.C.C. 340, 342 (1963); Agricultural Insecticides in Tank Cars from Heyden, 
N.J. to Houston, Tex., 319 I.C.C. 493, 495 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 623 (1962); Cereal, 
Coffee, Tea, Drugs, Related Articles from New Jersey & Pennsylvania to Texas, 319 
I.C.C. 424, 425 (1963); Candy & Confectionery-New Jersey, New York & Pennsylvania 
to Texas, 321 I.C.C. 154, 159 (1963); Export Grain &: Grain Products-WTL to Gulf & 
Lake Ports, 319 I.C.C. 729, 743 (1963), aff d., 321 I.C.C. 88 (1963); Pig Iron from Buffalo, 
N.Y. to Chicago, Ill. & Gary, Ind., 321 I.C.C. 121, 128-30 (1963), revg. in part 315 I.C.C. 
601 (1961); Plastics from Texas to the East, 319 I.C.C. 379, 381 (1963); Electric Cable 
&: Wire from Worcester, Mass. to Houston, Tex., 314 I.C.C. 743, 744 (1961), revd., 
319 I.C.C. 390 (1963). For cases to the same effect in which railroads protested reduced 
rates of other railroads, see Iron Ore, Cleveland, Ohio to Ohio & Pennsylvania, 323 
I.C.C, 746 (1965); Rail-Water, Grain in Bulk, Missouri, Illinois & Indiana to Buffalo, 
N.Y., 319 I.C.C. 123 (1963), revd. on other grounds, 321 I.C.C. 564 (1963). 
32. !126 I.C.C. 77 (1965), revd. sub nom. Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. 
Supp. 71 (\V.D. Ky. 1967), revd. sub nom. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968). 
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fully distributed costs of the water carrier. In that case, the water 
carrier had the lower folly distributed costs and the railroad the 
lower out-of-pocket costs; the Commission found that the railroad 
was likely to deprive the water carrier of its traflic.33 Using fully 
distributed costs as the proper criterion of cost advantage, the Com-
mission condemned the railroad rate as destructive competition.3i 
The central legal issue in Ingot Molds, however-whether fully 
distributed (fully allocated) or out-of-pocket (variable) costs or 
neither should be the measure of cost advantage-was not decided 
by the Supreme Court and remains unresolved.35 
B. The Railroads' Position 
The railroads favor out-of-pocket cost as the criterion of inher-
ent advantage; they argue that fully distributed costs lack rational 
justification and that the Commission misinterprets section 15a(3) 
and the National Transportation Policy. According to the railroads, 
the Commission has failed to explain why fully distributed costs 
should be the touchstone of inherent advantage or why the mode 
of transport with the lower fully distributed costs should be con-
sidered the more efficient one. They assert that the comparison of 
out-of-pocket, or incremental, costs is the only rational way to regu-
late competitive rates.36 
Congress, according to the railroads, intended the concept of 
"inherent advantages" to refer to situations in which one mode of 
transportation can operate with lower out-of-pocket costs than can 
others.87 Under the Act, such a mode must be allowed to "assert" 
its advantage by reducing rates to the level of its out-of-pock.et costs, 
if such a reduction is necessary to obtain traffic. By using fully 
distributed costs as the standard of cost advantage, the Commission 
has elevated railroad rates to a level that enables competing modes 
to obtain traffic at rates covering their fully distributed costs and 
thus violates the provision in section 15a(3) that rates "shall not be 
held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other 
mode.''38 
33. 326 I.C.C. at 80. 
34. 326 I.C.C. at 83-85. 
35. See notes 42-66 infra and accompanying text. 
36. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 8e N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 577 
(1962). The case for the railroads is most fully and effectively stated in the Baumol 
articles cited in note 4 supra. See also Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 
78 (1965). 
37. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 8e N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 582 
n.I 0 (1968). 
38. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964). 
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At the same time, the railroads claim the right to price their 
services so as to maximize their net revenues, subject to regulatory 
restraints. These restraints would include requirements that mini-
mum rates not fall below out-of-pocket costs, that maximum rates 
not exceed reasonable levels to be determined by the Commission, 
and that aggregate railroad earnings be limited to a "fair return."39 
C. The Position of the Supreme Court 
In New Haven, the Commission decided that the railroad rates 
involved, which had been reduced to the level of competing water-
carrier rates and which threatened to deprive water carriers of their 
traffic, constituted destructive competition.40 Because the Commis-
sion declined to make a finding on the issue of cost advantage, the 
Supreme Court reversed;41 but the Court indicated no preference 
between fully distributed and out-of-pocket costs as the criterion of 
cost advantage. 
In Ingot Molds, the Commission also condemned railroad rates 
as destructive competition, but explicitly found that the water car-
rier had the cost advantage.42 On review, therefore, it appeared that 
the Court was directly confronted with the task of interpreting sec-
tion 15a(3) and the National Transportation Policy. But, surpris-
ingly, the Court held otherwise. 
Ingot Molds involved the following facts. From 1953 until 1968, 
ingot molds were shipped from Neville Island and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania to Steelton, Kentucky almost exclusively by combina-
tion barge-truck service; since 1960 the total charge for the service 
had been $5.11 per ton. In 1963, the Pennsylvania and the Louis-
ville & Nashville railroads lowered their joint rate for the same 
traffic from $11.86 to $5.11 per ton. The competing barge lines pro-
tested to the Commission that the new railroad rate violated section 
15a(3) and the National Transportation Policy because it destroyed 
the "inherent advantage" of the barge-truck service.43 
The Commission made the following findings of fact, which 
were not in real dispute.44 The railroads' fully distributed costs were 
39. Baumol, supra note 4. 
40. Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 47 (1960). See discussion 
of the ICC opinion in note 25 supra. 
41. ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 760-61 (1963). 
42. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 84 (1965). 
43. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 572 
(1968). 
44. 392 U.S. at 572. 
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$7 .59 per ton and their out-of-pocket costs were $4.69 per ton. The 
railroad rate was therefore unquestionably compensatory. The fully 
distributed costs of the barge-truck service amounted to $5.19 per 
ton, which was substantially less than the fully distributed costs of 
the railroads. The barge-truck out-of-pocket costs, although not 
separately computed, were stipulated to be higher than the rail-
roads' out-of-pocket costs. From the shipper's viewpoint, price was 
the most important determinant in selecting a mode of transport; 
but because of service advantages, all the traffic would go to the 
railroads if the rates were equal. 
The Commission decided that the barge-truck movement had the 
inherent cost advantage45 and that the railroads "by reducing [their] 
rate be~ow the level of the barge-truck full costs •.. [had] unlawfully 
impinged upon the ability of the barge-truck mode competitively 
to assert its inherent cost advantage."46 The Commission concluded 
that the railroad rate was "unjust and unreasonable, and in contra-
vention of the national transportation policy."47 On review, a three-
judge panel sitting in the United States District for the Western 
District of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Commission, hold-
ing (1) that the Commission's order failed to state a rational basis 
for the use of fully distributed costs as the criterion of inherent 
advantage and (2) that the order was inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent in enacting section 15a(3), which was to establish 
out-of-pocket costs as the standard of inherent advantage.48 
The Supreme Court, in American Commercial Lines, Incorpo-
rated v. Louisville & N.R.R. (Ingot Molds),49 reversed the decision of 
the district court and gave directions to affirm the Commission's 
order. It disposed of the lower court's first holding by asserting that 
it "must logically follow" the second holding, "since, if Congress in 
enacting that section had already decided that inherent advantage 
should be determined by reference to fully distributed costs, there 
would be no special burden on the Commission to justify its use of 
them."50 The Court then rejected the district court's second holding, 
declaring that "at the very least, the result reached by the Commis-
45. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
46. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 85 (1965). 
47. 326 I.C.C. at 85. 
48. Louisville &: N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71, 75-76 r,v .D. Ky. 1967). 
49. 392 U.S. 571 (1968). 
50. 392 U.S. at 579. 
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sion here is presumptively in accord with the language of the statute 
and with the intent of Congress in utilizing that language."51 
But the Court did not decide that section 15a(3) required the 
"ICC to use fully distributed costs as the only measure of inherent 
advantage in intermodal rate controversies."52 The Court said that 
"[ a ]11 we hold here is that the initial determination of that question 
[cost advantage] is for the Commission."53 It construed the Com-
mission's finding of cost advantage in the case as "temporary" and 
declared that the Commission had authority to develop "a general 
standard of costing to use in determining inherent advantage in 
situations involving intermodal competition in the broad context 
of a rule-making proceeding" such as the proceeding that was pend-
ing in Rules To Govern the Assembling and Presenting of Cost 
Evidence (Docket Number 34013).54 But at least prior to the con-
summation of that proceeding, the Commission was permitted to use 
fully distributed costs as the standard for cost advantage. 
Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion in New Haven, 
concurred in the result reached in Ingot Molds and remarked that 
the Court "leaves this important question [ determining inherent 
cost advantage] just where our decision of five years ago in the New 
Haven case left it, and new litigation will now be necessary to re-
solve the issue."55 New litigation may be necessary, but Ingot Molds 
did not leave the "important question" exactly where New Haven 
left it. As the majority in Ingot Molds recognized, "[N]othing in the 
language of the New Haven opinion indicates a preference for either 
out-of-pocket or fully distributed costs as a measure of inherent ad-
vantage •••. "56 In Ingot Molds, however, the cumulative effect of the 
Court's language reveals a preference for fully distributed costs. 
In the first place, as noted previously,57 the Court stated that 
"at the very least" the use of fully distributed costs in the case is 
"presumptively" in accord with section 15a(3). And in the second 
place, the Court suggested that the use of fully distributed costs is 
in some sense mandatory under the section. Thus, the Court de-
clared that "nothing we say here should be taken as expressing 
51. 892 U.S. at 582. 
52. 892 U.S. at 590. 
58. 392 U.S. at 590. 
54. 892 U.S. at 591. Docket No. 84018, supra note 3, is discussed in note 18 supra. 
55. 892 U.S. at 597. 
56. 892 U.S. at 588. 
57. St:i: text accompanying note 51 supra. 
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any view as to the extent that § 15a(3) constitutes a categorical com-
mand to the ICC to use fully distributed costs as the only measure 
of inherent advantage in intermodal rate controversies."158 This lan-
guage is confusing because "categorical" normally signifies "abso-
lute."159 Either section 15a(3) constitutes a categorical-i.e., absolute 
----command or it does not. It appears reasonable to assume that the 
Court did not use "categorical" in the word's correct sense, but that 
it intended to give fully distributed costs some sanction as the crite-
rion of inherent advantage. 
In contrast with this generally favorable view of fully distributed 
costs, the Court was consistently critical of the use of out-of-pocket 
costs, both as a measure of inherent advantage and as a basis for 
establishing minimum rates for meeting intermodal competition. It 
characterized the district court's holding that section 15a(3) normally 
requires out-of-pocket costs to be the standard of inherent advantage 
as a "fallacy ..• [that] renders the terms 'inherent advantage' es-
sentially meaningless in the context of the language and history of 
§ 15a(3)."60 The Court further declared that there was "considerable 
force" in the argument that "permitting the railroads to price on an 
out-of-pocket basis to meet competition would result in the eventual 
complete triumph of the railroads in intermodal competition because 
of their ability to impose all their constant costs on traffic for which 
there was no competition."61 And, after discussing at length the 
testimony of economists in support of a discriminatory rate structure, 
the Court concluded: "The simple fact is that § 15a(3) was not 
enacted, as the railroads claim, to enable them to price their services 
in such a way as to obtain the maximum [net] revenue therefrom."62 
The Commission's "initial determination" of the criterion of 
cost advantage must now await the conclusion of the rule-making 
proceedings Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Proceedings, Docket 
Number 34013 (Sub-Number 1).63 In the original Docket Number 
58. 392 U.S. at 590. 
59. II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 180 (1933 ed.) defines "categorical" as "[a]sserting 
absolutely or positively; not involving a condition or hypothesis; unqualified," 
60. 392 U.S. at 581. 
61. 392 U.S. at 585-86. In a discriminatory rate structure, price varies with demand 
elasticity in order to achieve maximum net revenue. See pt. II. B. I. infra. 
62. 392 U.S. at 589. 
63. The rule-making proceeding entitled Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Pro-
ceedings, Docket No. 34013 (Sub-No. 1), was initiated on February 5, 1969. See note 18 
supra. 
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34013, the Commission introduced the terms "variable costs" and 
"fully allocated costs" to describe the cost levels that had previously 
been identified as "out-of-pocket costs" and "fully distributed costs," 
respectively.64 Both of these new terms exclude "profit, income taxes, 
and for railroads, the passenger and less-than-carload deficits."65 
Since fully allocated costs exclude these noncost elements, they are 
less objectionable from the standpoint of economic principle than 
are fully distributed costs. Similarly, the Commission's statement 
that " 'variable costs' ... is ... more descriptive [than out-of-pocket 
costs] of all the unit expenses properly associated with particular 
changes in output"66 indicates that the new concept is an improve-
ment on "out-of-pocket" costs. Because the new and old terms are 
basically equivalent, the Supreme Court's dicta in Ingot Molds favor-
ing fully distributed costs are applicable to fully allocated costs and 
its criticisms of out-of-pocket cost are applicable to variable costs. 
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if the Commission in 
Docket Number 34013 (Sub-Number 1) adopts fully allocated costs 
as the criterion of cost advantage, the Court is likely to approve that 
decision, at least in the circumstances of Ingot Molds. What the Court 
would do if the Commission reverses its predilection for full costs 
and decides that variable costs should be the proper standard is more 
difficult to predict. In Ingot Molds, the Court could have reasonably 
found that the issue of inherent advantage was before it, and it 
could have unequivocally affirmed the Commission's use of fully 
distributed costs. The fact that the Court left the issue undecided 
pending the Commission's "initial determination" indicates that it 
might approve variable costs, or even some other conception of cost 
advantage, if such a standard should be adopted by the Commission. 
II. ECONOMIC ISSUES 
In determining which criterion of cost advantage to adopt, the 
Commission and the Court will need to consider the relevant eco-
nomic issues. These issues can best be dealt with as two separate 
questions: What criterion of cost advantage is most likely to bring 
about an efficient allocation of resources? What rate-making princi-
ples are consistent with such a criterion? 
64. 337 I.C.C. at 324. 
65. 337 I.C.C. at 326. 
66. 337 I.C.C. at 325. 
1026 Michigan Law Review [Vol 69:1011 
A The Appropriate Criterion 
Three possible criteria of cost advantage-fully allocated costs, 
variable costs, and marginal costs-require discussion. Fully allocated 
cost is an inappropriate criterion because it includes an arbitrary 
apportionment of joint and common (overhead) costs-costs that are 
not directly associated with the particular services that are in con-
troversy under section 15a(3).67 Since these costs are incurred whether 
or not the services are produced, they do not measure the economic 
cost of specific services and cannot properly serve as a criterion of 
cost advantage. 
From the standpoint of economic principle, the Commission's 
conception of variable cost68 is almost as objectionable as is fully 
allocated cost. For, according to the Commission, variable cost-
like fully allocated cost-"represents a level of expense which in-
cludes, among other things, an apportionment of joint or common 
expenses which, in fact, are not necessarily incurred as a direct re-
sult of a particular movement [of traffic]."69 Thus, the only difference 
between the Commission's variable cost and fully allocated cost is 
that the latter includes a larger element of uneconomic cost; in 
principle they are similarly defective. 
Marginal cost is by definition free of this economic defect because 
it excludes any arbitrary apportionment of joint or common costs. 
Marginal cost may be defined as the additional cost associated di-
rectly with the production of the particular service.70 Since a carrier 
does not incur marginal cost unless an additional service is produced, 
such cost is avoidable. Marginal cost is measured by the value of 
the additional resources consumed in the production of the addi-
tional service. Under a marginal-cost standard, the carrier employing 
the least valuable set of resources in furnishing services must neces-
sarily be regarded as having the cost advantage. 
67. The Commission specifically defines joint or common costs as those "expenses 
which are incurred on behalf of a production process yielding two or more kinds of 
output." 337 I.C.C. at 428. 
68. The ICC defines variable costs as "unit-costs of output which change with 
changes in the volume of output." 337 I.C.C. at 428. 
69. 337 I.C.C. at 324. Contrary to economic principle, the Commission associates 
variable costs with a time period that it has not yet determined. 337 I.C.C. at ?26. It is 
difficult to understand the relevance of cost variations over a period of time in fixing 
rates for particular services. For the economic nature of cost variability, or rather cost 
elasticity, see Borts, Increasing Returns in the Railway Industry, 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 816 
(1954). 
70. R:. l.EnwICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM: AND R.F.sOURCE A.u.oCA.TION 148 (rev. ed. 1960). 
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B. Rate-Making Method 
Marginal-cost pricing is obviously consistent with the use of 
marginal cost as the criterion of cost advantage. It also meets the 
pricing requirement of welfare economic theory.71 But marginal-cost 
pricing in transport would fail to cover full costs, which a carrier 
must recover in order to stay in business. What is needed is a second-
best method of rate-making, one which approximates more closely 
than any other method the economic advantages of marginal-cost 
pricing and, insofar as possible, returns full costs. Two methods have 
been proposed. One provides for discriminatory rates, and the other 
provides for rates equal to marginal cost plus a uniform increment. 
I. Rate Discrimination 
While the railroads accept marginal cost as the criterion of cost 
advantage, they argue for discriminatory rates. They propose that 
marginal cost "set the lower boundary (and demand considerations 
and regulation the upper boundary) within which pricing decisions 
should be made."72 Their proposal would refer to marginal cost 
in order to determine "the specific rate which will provide maximum 
contribution to the overhead burden and thus to net income."73 
This proposal is clearly equivalent to third-degree discrimination 
designed to maximize earnings.74 
71. "Welfare economics" bas been defined as "the branch of economic science that 
attempts to establish and apply criteria of propriety to economic policies." M. REDER, 
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 13 (1947). The choice of acceptable 
criteria is the crux of welfare economics. Welfare economics is distinguished from 
positive economics by the latter's exclusive concern with cause and effect relationships 
with no attempt to establish criteria for economic policies. J. HADAR, ELEMENTARY 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 14 (1966). For the role of marginal-cost pricing in 
welfare economic theory, see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A 
MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 206 (1958); A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL ch. 6 
(1944); M. REDER, supra at 49; T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPE'llTION 165 (1951). 
72. Baumol, supra note 4, at 362. 
73. Id. 
74. For the conventional analysis of third-degree discrimination, see J. ROBINSON, 
THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT CoMPETITION ch. 15 (1936). This analysis postulates the 
production of a single homogeneous product (service), a uniform marginal-cost curve, 
and several markets that are separated according to differences in demand elasticity. 
Prices differ as elasticity differs, and net revenue is maximized when marginal revenue 
is the same in all markets. In reality, however, the railroads furnish multiple services, 
and it may well be that the relevant economic model should include separate marginal-
cost curves associated with each of the services rather than a uniform marginal-cost 
curve. Bailey, Price and Output Determination by a Firm Selling Related Products, 
44 AM. ECON. REv. 82 (1954). For a firm producing multiple products with a uniform 
marginal-cost curve, the Robinson analysis bas been extended by Eli ·w. Clemens in 
Price Discrimination and the Multiple Product Firm, 29(1) REv. EcoN. STUDIES 1 
(1950-51). 
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Rate discrimination is not consistent with the use of marginal 
cost as the criterion of cost advantage, because discriminatory rates 
are primarily governed by demand rather than by cost. Rate dis-
crimination employs marginal cost merely as a "guide" to maximize 
net earnings. Under discrimination, the level of rates and differences 
in rates are admittedly determined by differences in demand elasti-
city, not by differences in marginal cost. It has been observed that 
"[b ]asing rates on demand (as well as on incremental costs) to attain 
the maximum contributions means . . • that rates for all services 
will not be the same either absolutely, or in relation to cost, or in 
contribution to the net income of the carriers."76 A rate structure 
characterized by differences in rates unrelated to differences in cost 
cannot approximate the economic advantages of marginal-cost pric-
ing. 
The railroads, nonetheless, argue that rate discrimination is in 
both the public and their own interest. Rate discrimination is clearly 
in the interest of the railroads because it is designed to maximize 
their earnings. They claim it is also in the public interest because it 
"can foster more efficient use of railroad resources and capacity and 
can therefore lower costs and rates.''76 This claim is of doubtful va-
lidity. In the first place, present railroad resources probably reflect 
excess capacity,77 and hence correct economic policy and the public 
interest require disinvestment rather than increased use. In the sec-
ond place, no proof is presented that increased traffic will neces-
sarily lower marginal costs, which are the only factor that should be 
relevant for rate-making. The railroads do not identify the rates that 
"can" be lowered. It is reasonable to assume that the reference to 
lower rates relates to rates in markets with inelastic demand and that 
these rates are therefore high relative to marginal cost. But even if 
both traffic and net income increase under discrimination, the rail-
roads will not reduce such rates as long as their aggregate earnings 
75. Baumol, supra note 4, at 363 (emphasis added). 
76. Id. at 365-66. 
On the assumption that the third-degree model applies, it has been demonstrated 
that discrimination will not necessarily lower costs or rates (nor even increase output) 
as compared with simple monopoly or average-cost pricing. Miller, Decreasing Average 
Cost and the Theory of Railroad Rates, 41 S. EcoN. J. 390 (1935). It is clear that the 
same results follow if multiple products are associated with a uniform marginal-cost 
curve. And substantially the same results follow if separate marginal-cost curves are 
introduced. See note 74 supra. 
77. The wave of recent railroad mergers suggests such excess capacity, since elimina-
tion of excess facilities is usually one of the prime objectives of mergers. M. CoNANT, 
RAILROAD MERGERS AND .ABANDONMENTS ch. IV (1964). 
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are considered inadequate, and they are likely to be so considered 
in the foreseeable future.78 
It may still be argued that rate discrimination is in the public 
interest because it is good for the railroads and what is good for the 
railroads is in the public interest. But a discriminatory-rate structure 
fashioned to maximize railroad earnings may result in a maldistribu-
tion of resources. In effect, such a structure imposes a tax on some 
producers and areas while extending a bounty to others. In this 
manner it may discourage efficiency in resource allocation and en-
courage inefficiency. Especially since the railroads do not deny this 
possibility,70 it is clear that a discriminatory-rate structure is con-
trary to the public interest. 
2. lviarginal Cost Plus a Uniform Increment 
The least objectionable method of fixing rates for particular 
services subject to intermodal competition is to add a uniform in-
crement to the marginal costs of competing modes of transport.80 
It can easily be employed in the three situations that differ in re-
spect of cost behavior. 
In the situation that is most difficult to deal with from a regu-
latory standpoint, one mode (A) has the lower marginal cost but a 
competing mode (B) has the lower fully allocated cost.81 Under the 
proposed method, A's rate would equal A's fully allocated cost and 
B's rate the sum of B's marginal cost and an increment equal to the 
difference benveen A's marginal cost and A's fully allocated cost. 
Under the policy expressed by the Commission in Ingot Molds, B's 
rate would equal B's fully allocated cost and A's rate would exceed 
78. In the decade 1959-1968, the rate of return experienced by class I railroads of 
the United States ranged from 1.97% in 1961 to 3,9% in 1966. The rate was related to 
investment after depreciation, the lowest usable rate base. AssocIATION OF AMERICAN 
RAILROADS, RAILROAD REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 7 (1970). More recent trends are even less 
encouraging. For the twelve months ended September 30, 1970, the rate of return was 
1.77%. Association of American Railroads, Information Letter No. 1939, Nov. 4, 1970. 
79. Baumol, Clarification, supra note 4, at 349. 
so. J. SARGENT, BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICY ch. 4 (1958); Vickrey, Some Implications 
of Marginal Cost Pricing for Public Utilities, 67 AM. EcoN. AssN.-PAPERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS, 45 A1.r. ECON. REv. 605 (1958). 
81. This situation is identical to that in Ingot Molds, if the assumption is made 
that the mode having the lower out-of-pocket cost also has the lower marginal cost. 
Here it can be argued that it would be preferable to set B's rates at B's marginal cost 
times the ratio of A's fully distributed (average) cost to A's marginal cost. Equal 
proportionality between prices and marginal cost may be a better approximation to 
the standard welfare optimum conditions. On the other hand, the uniform increment 
has the advantage of simplicity. 
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B's fully allocated cost in a measure calculated to enable B at least 
to share in the traffic. But after New Haven, the Commission would 
not prescribe a rate for A above A's fully allocated cost.82 In any 
event, A would be barred from establishing a rate reflecting its 
superior efficiency, which is indicated by its lower marginal cost. 
In the second situation, A's marginal and fully allocated costs are 
both lower than B's. The proposal suggested here would be to 
prescribe rates precisely in the same manner as in the preceding case. 
In some circumstances it may be desirable to fix B's rate at B's fully 
allocated cost. In that event, the mode having the lower marginal 
cost would still have the lower rate, and a measure of flexibility 
would be afforded. Under the Commission's present policy, B's rate 
would exceed A's by a margin computed to enable A to participate 
in the traffic at rates covering A's fully allocated costs. Again B's 
maximum rate would equal B's fully allocated cost; but B's rate 
would not be designed by the Commission to reflect the measure 
of A's marginal-cost superiority. 
Finally, in the third situation, the two modes' marginal costs are 
equal but A's fully allocated costs are higher than B's. The addition 
of a uniform increment to the marginal costs of both A and B would 
result in equal rates. Again it may be found preferable at times 
to provide £or flexibility by establishing rates £or A and B at the 
fully allocated cost of each. But since marginal costs are equal, there 
is less justification £or unequal rates than in the preceding cases. 
Here again the Commission would require A's rate to be at a level 
that would enable B to obtain traffic at rates covering its fully al-
located cost but that would not be above A's fully allocated cost. 
Such rates would fail to indicate the equal efficiency of the compet-
ing modes. 
Under a system of discriminatory rates, all that can be said is 
that marginal cost would serve as the minimum in all three situa-
tions. The margin by which the precise rate would exceed that 
minimum would depend upon the character of the demand £or the 
service. In markets where demand is relatively elastic because of 
severe intermodal competition, the margin would be small and rates 
relatively low; in markets where demand is inelastic because of the 
absence of such competition, the margin would be large and rates 
relatively high. Thus, rates would reflect neither differences in mar-
ginal cost not the relative efficiency of competing modes. 
82. See note 28 supra. 
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In all three situations, establishment of rates at the level of 
marginal cost plus a uniform increment would be consistent with 
a marginal-cost standard of cost advantage, because such rates would 
reflect differences in marginal cost. At the same time, the rates 
would tend to recover full costs. Since such rates would have the 
additional merit of departing only slightly from the conventional 
application of full cost in rate-making, they would maintain sub-
stantial continuity in the Commission's policy. 
III. SUMMARY 
The principal legal issue in section 15a(3) rate-making proceed-
ings involving intermodal competition concerns the determination 
of the proper criterion for calculating inherent cost advantage; the 
principal economic issues encompass the same search for the proper 
criterion and also cognate rate-making principles. 
The legal issue has been argued before the Supreme Court in 
two cases, but the Court found both times that it was not necessary 
to decide the issue, because the Commission had not made an "ini-
tial determination" of cost advantage. There is, however, a difference 
between the relevant dicta in the two cases. In New Haven, the Court 
indicated no preference between fully distributed costs (now fully 
allocated costs) and out-of-pocket costs (now variable costs) and 
even said that the appropriate measure of cost advantage "may be" 
neither.83 In Ingot :Molds, however, the Court clearly favored fully 
distributed costs. 84 It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if the 
Commission should make an intial determination in favor of fully 
allocated cost as the standard of cost advantage, the Court would 
approve. It is less likely, but still probable, that the Court would 
approve a determination by the Commission that variable cost is 
the proper criterion. It is, however, unlikely that the Court would 
interpret section 15a(3) as a "categorical demand" to adopt either 
fully distributed costs or out-of-pocket costs, or any other standard. 
According to economic principle, marginal cost is the correct 
standard because it measures the social value of resources used in 
performing the particular services in controversy under section 
15a(3). But simply equating rates with marginal cost is impracticable 
because such rates would normally fail to cover a carrier's full costs. 
Discriminatory rates, designed to maximize net income, are not 
consistent with a marginal-cost standard, because they are governed 
83. ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 760 (1963). 
84. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra. 
1032 Michigan Law Review 
primarily not by cost but by demand. Furthermore, they may distort 
resource allocation and are therefore not in the public interest. 
Rates calculated as the sum of marginal cost and a uniform incre-
ment are consistent with a marginal-cost standard and tend to cover 
fully allocated costs. 0£ all practicable proposals, therefore, only this 
method of rate calculation is consistent with marginal cost as the 
criterion of cost advantage and is in the public interest. 
